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Abstract
The Arrow-Debreu extension of the classic Hylland-Zeckhauser scheme [HZ79] for a one-
sided matching market – called ADHZ in this paper – has natural applications but has
instances which do not admit equilibria. By introducing approximation, we define the ǫ-
approximate ADHZ model. We give the following results.
1. Existence of equilibrium for the ǫ-approximate ADHZ model under linear utility func-
tions. The equilibrium satisfies Pareto optimality, approximate envy-freeness and incen-
tive compatibility in the large.
2. A combinatorial polynomial time algorithm for an ǫ-approximate ADHZ equilibrium
for the case of dichotomous, and more generally bi-valued, utilities.
3. An instance of ADHZ, with dichotomous utilities and a strongly connected demand
graph, which does not admit an equilibrium.
4. A rational convex program for HZ under dichotomous utilities; a combinatorial polyno-
mial time algorithm for this case was given in [VY20].
The ǫ-approximate ADHZ model fills a void in the space of general mechanisms for one-
sided matching markets; see details in the paper.
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1 Introduction
In this paper, we define an Arrow-Debreu extension of the classic Hylland-Zeckhauser (HZ)
scheme [HZ79] for a one-sided matching market. This fills a void in the space of general1 mecha-
nisms for one-sided matching markets. Such mechanisms are classified according to two criteria:
whether they use cardinal or ordinal utility functions, and whether they are in the Fisher or
Arrow-Debreu2 setting. The other three possibilities are covered as follows: (cardinal, Fisher)
by the Hylland-Zeckhauser scheme [HZ79]; (ordinal, Fisher) by Probabilistic Serial [BM01] and
Random Priority [Mou18]; and (ordinal, Arrow-Debreu) by Top Trading Cycles [SS74]. Details
about these mechanisms are given in Section 1.2.
The issue of obtaining an Arrow-Debreu extension of the HZ scheme, called ADHZ in this pa-
per, was studied by Hylland and Zeckhauser; this culminated in an example which inherently
does not admit an equilibrium [HZ79]. To get around such examples, we resort to finding an
approximate equilibrium, a notion that has become common-place in the study of equilibria within
computer science. We call this the ǫ-approximate ADHZ model. For this model, we prove the
existence of an equilibrium for arbitrary cardinal utility functions. For the case of dichotomous
utilities, i.e., 0/1 utilities, we give a combinatorial polynomial time algorithm for computing an
equilibrium. Furthermore, we extend this result to the case of bi-valued utilities, i.e., each agent’s
utility for individual goods comes from a set of cardinality two, though the sets may be different
for different agents.
Similar to HZ, our model also resorts to using the power of a pricing mechanism, which comes
with its own advantages, e.g., it prevents artificial scarcity of goods and ensures that scarce
goods are allocated to agents who have the most utility for them. We note that HZ (ADHZ)
can be viewed as a marriage between a fractional perfect matching and a linear Fisher (Arrow-
Debreu) market. The Arrow-Debreu setting of one-sided matching markets has several natural
applications beyond the Fisher setting, e.g., allocating students to rooms in a dorm for the next
academic year, assuming their current room is their initial endowment.
One recourse to the absence of equilibrium in ADHZ was given by Echenique, Miralles and
Zhang [EMZ19a] via their notion of an α-slack Walrasian equilibrium: This is a hybrid between
the Fisher and Arrow-Debreu settings. Agents have initial endowments of goods and for a fixed
α ∈ (0, 1], the budget of each agent, for given prices of goods, is α+ (1− α) · m, where m is the
value for her initial endowment; the agent spends this budget to obtain an optimal bundle of
goods. Via a non-trivial proof, using the Kakutani Fixed Point Theorem, they proved that an
α-slack equilibrium always exists. Our proof of existence of equilibrium for the ǫ-approximate
ADHZ model is based on their existence result.
The two ways of expressing utilities of goods – ordinal and cardinal – have their own pros and
cons and neither dominates the other. On the one hand, the former is easier to elicit from agents
and on the other, the latter is far more expressive, enabling an agent to not only report if she
prefers good A to good B but also by how much. [ACY15] exploit this greater expressivity of
cardinal utilities to give mechanisms for school choice which are superior to ordinal-utility-based
mechanisms.
1As opposed to mechanisms for specific one-sided matching markets.
2This is also called the Walrasian or exchange setting.
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The following example illustrates the advantage of cardinal vs ordinal utilities. The instance has
three types of goods, T1, T2, T3, and these goods are present in the proportion of (1%, 97%, 2%).
Based on their utility functions, the agents are partitioned into two sets A1 and A2, where A1
constitute 1% of the agents and A2, 99%. The utility functions of agents in A1 and A2 for the
three types of goods are (1, ǫ, 0) and (1, 1− ǫ, 0), respectively, for a small number ǫ > 0. The
main point is that whereas agents in A2 marginally prefer T1 to T2, those in A1 overwhelmingly
prefer T1 to T2.
Clearly, the ordinal utilities of all agents in A1 ∪ A2 are the same. Therefore, a mechanism based
on such utilities will not be able to make a distinction between the two types of agents. On the
other hand, the HZ mechanism, which uses cardinal utilities, will fix the price of goods in T3
to be zero and those in T1 and T2 appropriately so that by-and-large the bundles of A1 and A2
consist of goods from T1 and T2, respectively.
The computer science revolutions of the Internet and mobile computing were a big boon for the
area of matching-based market design, leading to the launching of several highly innovative and
successful markets, e.g., Adwords, Uber and Airbnb; see also [ftToC19]. In anticipation of future
innovations, it is important to explore novel mechanisms for matching markets. Our work was
motivated by these considerations.
1.1 Our Results
The allocation found by an HZ equilibrium is Pareto optimal and envy-free [HZ79] and incentive
compatible in the large [HMPY18]. We prove that the equilibrium in our ǫ-approximate ADHZ
model is Pareto optimal and approximately envy free, and following HZ, it is also incentive
compatible in the large.
As mentioned above, for the case of dichotomous utilities, we give a combinatorial polynomial
time algorithm for computing an equilibrium in our ǫ-approximate ADHZ model. We note that
the polynomial time algorithm of [DM15] for Arrow-Debreu markets under linear utilities, as
well as the recent strongly polynomial time algorithm for the same problem [GV19] are quite
complicated, in particular because they resort to the use of balanced flows, which uses the l2
norm. In contrast, we managed to avoid the use of the l2 norm and hence we obtain a simple
algorithm.
For an Arrow-Debreu market under linear utilities, Gale [Gal76] defined a demand graph: a di-
rected graph on agents with an edge (i, j) if agent i likes a good that agent j has in her initial
endowment. He proved that a sufficiency condition for the existence of equilibrium is that this
graph be strongly connected. The following question arises naturally: Is this a sufficiency con-
dition for existence of an equilibrium in ADHZ as well? Via a counter-example, we provide a
negative answer to this question. Additionally, our counter-example has dichotomous utilities.
For the HZ model, [VY20] gave an instance whose (unique) equilibrium has irrational prices and
allocations. By appropriately modifying this instance, we obtain an instance of ADHZ whose
unique equilibrium has irrational prices and allocations.
Next, we prove that if α > 0 is chosen to be a rational number, then for the case of dichoto-
mous utilities, an α-slack equilibrium has rational prices and allocations. This led us to ask if
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there is a rational convex program (RCP) that captures the equilibrium in this setting. An RCP,
defined in [Vaz12], is a nonlinear convex program all of whose parameters are rational num-
bers and which always admits a rational solution in which the denominators are polynomially
bounded. The quintessential such program is the Eisenberg-Gale convex program [EG59] for a
linear Fisher market. The significance of finding such a program for a problem is that it directly
implies existence of a polynomial time algorithm for the underlying problem, since using the
ellipsoid algorithm and diophantine approximation [GLS12, Jai07], an RCP can be solved exactly
in polynomial time. Although we were not able to answer this question, we did find an RCP
for HZ equilibrium under dichotomous utilities. A combinatorial polynomial time algorithm for
this case was given in [VY20].
1.2 Related Results
We start by stating the properties of the mechanisms for one-sided matching markets listed in
the Introduction. Random Priority [Mou18] is strategyproof though not efficient or envy-free;
Probabilistic Serial [BM01] is efficient and envy-free but not strategyproof; and Top Trading
Cycles [SS74] is efficient, strategyproof and core-stable.
The study of the dichotomous case of matching markets was initiated by Bogomolnaia and
Moulin [BM04]. They studied a two-sided matching market and they called it an “important
special case of the bilateral matching problem.” Using the Gallai-Edmonds decomposition of a
bipartite graph, they gave a mechanism that is Pareto optimal and group strategyproof. They
also gave a number of applications of their setting, some of which are natural applications of one-
sided markets as well, e.g., housemates distributing rooms, having different features, in a house.
As in the HZ scheme, their mechanism also outputs a doubly-stochastic matrix whose entries
represent probability shares of allocations. However, they give another interesting interpretation
of this matrix. They say, “Time sharing is the simplest way to deal fairly with indivisibilities of
matching markets: think of a set of workers sharing their time among a set of employers.” Roth,
Sonmez and Unver [RSU¨05] extended these results to general graph matching under dichoto-
mous utilities; this setting is applicable to the kidney exchange marketplace.
We note that that the HZ (fractional) equilibrium allocation is a superior starting point than
[BM04] for the problem of designing a randomized time-sharing mechanism. We note that the
Gallai-Edmonds decomposition of a bipartite graph classifies vertices into three categories: dis-
posable, over-demanded and perfectly matched. This is a coarse insight into the demand struc-
ture of vertices compared to the one found by an HZ equilibrium, since the latter is the output of
a market mechanism in which equilibrium prices reflect the relative importance of goods in an
accurate and precise manner, based on the utilities declared by buyers.
Recently, [VY20] undertook a comprehensive study of the computational complexity of the HZ
scheme. As stated above, they gave a polynomial time algorithm for dichotomous utilities. Fur-
ther, they extended the algorithm to the case of bi-valued utilities under which each agent has
a two-valued set from which all her utilities for goods come. They showed that the problem
of computing an exact HZ equilibrium is in the class FIXP and the problem of computing an
approximate equilibrium is in PPAD. They left open the problem of giving the corresponding
hardness results.
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Several researchers have proposed Hylland-Zeckhauser-type mechanisms for a number of appli-
cations, for instance [Bud11, HMPY18, Le17, McL18]. The basic scheme has also been generalized
in several different directions, including two-sided matching markets, adding quantitative con-
straints, and to the setting in which agents have initial endowments of goods instead of money,
see [EMZ19a, EMZ19b].
2 Preliminaries
The Hylland-Zeckhauser mechanism can be viewed as a marriage between a fractional perfect
matching and a linear Fisher market. The latter is defined as follows.
Definition 1. In a (linear) Fisher market, we have a set A of agents and a set G of goods. Each
agent i comes to the market with a budget bi and has utilities uij ≥ 0 for each good j.
The goal in a linear Fisher market is then to use prices in order to allocate the goods to the agents
in a fair and efficient manner according to their budgets. This is captured by the concept of a
Fisher equilibrium.
Definition 2. A Fisher equilibrium is a pair (x, p) consisting of an allocation (xij)i∈A,j∈G and prices
(pj)j∈G with the following properties.
1. Each agent i spends at most their budget, i.e. ∑j∈G pjxij ≤ bi.
2. Each agent i gets an optimal bundle, i.e. utility maximizing bundle at prices p. Formally:
∑
j∈G
uijxij = max
{
∑
j∈G
uijyj
∣∣∣∣∣ y ∈ RG≥0, ∑
j∈G
pjyj ≤ bi
}
.
3. The market clears, i.e. each good with positive price is fully allocated to the agents.
Fisher equilibria satisfy various nice properties, including equal-type envy-freeness, Pareto opti-
mality, and approximate incentive compatibility in large markets.
Definition 3. An allocation is envy-free if for any two agents i, i′ ∈ A, agent i weakly prefers
their allocation than those that i′ gets; formally we have ∑j∈G uijxij ≥ ∑j∈G uijxi′ j. It is equal-type
envy-free if the above holds for any two agents with identical budgets.
Definition 4. An allocation x weakly dominates another allocation x′ if no agent prefers x′ to x. It
strongly dominates x′ if it weakly dominates it and there is at least one agent who prefers x to x′.
An allocation x is Pareto efficient or Pareto optimal if there is no other allocation x′ which strongly
dominates it.
Definition 5. A mechanism is incentive compatible if no agent can improve the total utility they
accrue by misreporting their preferences/utilities to the mechanism.
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The set of equilibria of a linear Fisher market corresponds to the set of optimal solutions of the
Eisenberg-Gale convex program [EG59].
max
(xij)i∈A,j∈G
∑
i∈A
bi log ∑
j∈G
uijxij
s.t. ∑
i∈A
xij ≤ 1 ∀j ∈ G,
xij ≥ 0 ∀i ∈ A, j ∈ G.
This is a rational convex program and in fact it motivated the definition of this concept, given in
[Vaz12].
Definition 6. A one-sided matching market consists of a set A of agents and a set G of goods with
|A| = |G| = n. Each agent has preferences over all goods, expressed either using cardinal or
ordinal utility functions. An allocation is a perfect matching of agents to goods. The goal of
the market is to find an allocation so that the underlying mechanism has some desirable game-
theoretic properties.
The Hylland-Zeckhauser mechanism uses cardinal utility functions, uij ≥ 0, for each agent i and
good j. Under this mechanism, each good is rendered divisible by viewing it as one unit of
probability shares. Each good is assigned a price pj ≥ 0 and each agent has a budget bi (generally
bi = 1 for all agents) with which it buys an optimal bundle of these probability shares, subject to
the conditions given below.
Definition 7. A Hylland-Zeckhauser (HZ) equilibrium is a pair (x, p) consisting of an allocation
(xij)i∈A,j∈G and prices (pj)j∈G with the following properties.
1. x is a fractional perfect matching, i.e. ∑j∈G xij = 1 for all agents i and ∑i∈A xij = 1 for all
goods j.
2. Each agent i spends at most their budget, i.e. ∑j∈G pjxij ≤ bi.
3. Each agent i gets an optimal bundle, which is defined to be a cheapest utility maximizing
bundle; formally:
∑
j∈G
uijxij = max
{
∑
j∈G
uijyj
∣∣∣∣∣ y ∈ ∆G, ∑
j∈G
pjyj ≤ bi
}
and
∑
j∈G
pjxij = min
{
∑
j∈G
pjyj
∣∣∣∣∣ y ∈ ∆G, ∑
j∈G
uijyj ≥ ∑
j∈G
uijxij
}
.
where ∆G := {y ∈ R
G
≥0 | ∑j∈G yj = 1} is the (n− 1)-simplex.
One can then show that HZ equilibria, like Fisher equilibria, are Pareto optimal, envy-free (as-
suming unit budgets), and approximately incentive compatible in large markets [HMPY18].
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Remark 8. Pareto optimality for HZ equilibria requires that each agent receives a cheapest utility
maximizing bundle. If this condition is dropped, we get the following kind of counter-examples
to Pareto optimality: The instance has two agents a1 and a2, and two goods g1 and g2 with u11 =
u21 = u22 = 1; u12 = 0. The prices (2, 0) together with the allocation x11 = x12 = x21 = x22 = 0.5
are optimal bundles, though not cheapest. The utilities in this equilibrium are 0.5 for agent a1
and 1 for agent a2. However, there is another HZ equilibrium with prices (1, p), for any p ∈ [0, 1]
with utility 1 for both agents.
The allocation x found by the HZ mechanism is a fractional perfect matching or a doubly-
stochastic matrix. In order to get an integral perfect matching from x, a lottery can be carried
out using the Theorem of Birkhoff [Bir46] and von Neumann [VN53]. It states that any doubly-
stochastic matrix can be written as a convex combination of integral perfect matchings; moreover,
this decomposition can be found efficiently. Picking a perfect matching according to the discrete
probability distribution determined by this convex combination yields the resulting allocation in
the HZ mechanism.
In this paper we are interested in an exchange version of the HZ mechanism. Before defining it,
we introduce the Arrow-Debreu market under linear utility functions.
Definition 9. In the (linear) Arrow-Debreu (AD) market, we have a set A of agents and a set G of
goods. Each agent i comes to the market with an endowment eij ≥ 0 of each good j and also has a
utility uij ≥ 0. Each good j must be fully owned by the agents, i.e. ∑i∈A eij = 1 for all j ∈ G.
Definition 10. An Arrow-Debreu (AD) equilibrium for a given AD market is a pair (x, p) consisting
of an allocation (xij)i∈A,j∈G and prices (pj)j∈G with the following properties.
1. Each agent i spends at most the budget which they obtain from selling their endowment,
i.e. ∑j∈G pjxij ≤ bi := ∑j∈G pjeij.
2. Each agent i gets an optimal bundle, i.e. utility maximizing bundle at prices p. Formally:
∑
j∈G
uijxij = max
{
∑
j∈G
uijyj
∣∣∣∣∣ y ∈ RG≥0, ∑
j∈G
pjyj ≤ bi
}
.
3. The market clears, i.e. each good with positive price is fully allocated to the agents.
AD equilibria are a generalization of Fisher equilibria in the sense that any Fisher market can be
easily transformed into an AD market by giving each agent equal endowments of every good.
Clearly, AD equilibria satisfy the condition of individual rationality, defined below, since every
agent could always buy back their endowment.
Definition 11. An allocation in an AD market is individually rational if for every agent i we have
∑j∈G uijxij ≥ ∑j∈G uijeij, i.e. no agent loses utility by participating in the market.
However, individual rationality fundamentally clashes with envy-freeness. Consider a market
consisting of two agents each owning a distinct good. Assume that both agents prefer the good
of agent 2 over the good of agent 1, then in any allocation either agent 1 envies agent 2 or agent
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2’s individual rationality is violated. For this reason we primarily consider a version of equal-
type envy-freeness in exchange markets, which demands envy-freeness only for agents with the
same initial endowment.
AD equilibria do not always need to exist. However, there is a simple necessary and sufficient
condition for their existence, due to Gale [Gal76]. Assume without loss of generality that each
agent i likes some good, i.e., uij > 0 for a j ∈ G, and similarly, each good j is liked by some agent,
i.e., uij > 0 for an i ∈ A. A set of agents S is called self-sufficient if each agent in S only likes the
goods brought by the members of S. Further, S is called super self-sufficient if in addition some
agent in S owns a good which is not liked by any member of S.
Theorem 12 ([Gal76]). An AD market admits an equilibrium if and only if no subset of A is super
self-sufficient.
Several polynomial-time algorithms for computing an equilibrium in AD markets have been
obtained under the necessary and sufficiency condition, e.g., [Jai07, DM15, GV19]. An RCP for
this problem was given by Devanur, Garg and Vegh [DGV16].
3 Results on the ADHZ Model
We now turn to the extension of the Hylland-Zeckhauser mechanism to exchange markets.
Definition 13. In the ADHZ market, we have a set A of agents and a set G of goods with |A| =
|G| = n. Each agent i comes to the market with an endowment eij ≥ 0 of each good j and utilities
uij ≥ 0. The endowment vector e is a fractional perfect matching.
Definition 14. An ADHZ equilibrium for a given ADHZ market is a pair (x, p) consisting of an
allocation (xij)i∈A,j∈G and prices (pj)j∈G with the following properties.
1. x is a fractional perfect matching, i.e. ∑j∈G xij = 1 for all agents i and likewise ∑i∈A xij = 1
for all goods j.
2. Each agent i spends at most the budget which they obtain from selling their endowment,
i.e. ∑j∈G pjxij ≤ bi := ∑j∈G pjeij.
3. Each agent i gets an optimal bundle, which is defined to be a cheapest utility maximizing
bundle; formally:
∑
j∈G
uijxij = max
{
∑
j∈G
uijyj
∣∣∣∣∣ y ∈ ∆G, ∑
j∈G
pjyj ≤ bi
}
and
∑
j∈G
pjxij = min
{
∑
j∈G
pjyj
∣∣∣∣∣ y ∈ ∆G, ∑
j∈G
uijyj ≥ ∑
j∈G
uijxij
}
,
where ∆G := {y ∈ R
G
≥0 | ∑j∈G yj = 1} is the (n− 1)-simplex.
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Theorem 15. ADHZ equilibria are Pareto optimal, individually rational, and equal-type envy-free.
Proof. Pareto optimality follows from the fact that any ADHZ equilibrium is an HZ equilibrium
with certain budgets b. Since any HZ equilibrium is Pareto optimal, we get the same for ADHZ
equilibria.
Note that the budget of any agent is always enough to buy back their initial endowment. Since
they get an optimal bundle, they must get something which they value at least as high as their
initial endowment. Thus individual rationality is guaranteed.
If two agents, say 1 and 2, have the same endowment, then their budget will be the same and so
agent 1 will never value the bundle of agent 2 higher than their own. Thus ADHZ equilibria are
equal-type envy-free.
We expect ADHZ equilibria to be approximately incentive compatible in larget markets as is the
case for HZ (for some suitable definition), since any individual can not influence prices by too
much. However, results of this kind are rather technical and beyond the scope of this paper.
Like in the case of HZ, equilibrium prices in ADHZ are invariant under the operation of scaling
the difference of prices from 1, as shown in the following lemma.
Lemma 16. Suppose p be an equilibrium price vector. For any r > 0, let p′ be such that p′j− 1 = r(pj− 1)
for all j ∈ G. Then p′ is also an equilibrium price vector.
Proof. Let x be an equilibrium allocation at prices p. For any agent i, we have ∑j∈G xijpj ≤
∑j∈G eijpj. We show that the pair (x, p
′) is also an equilibrium.
Since (x, p) is an equilibrium, we have
∀i ∈ A : ∑
j∈G
uijxij = max
{
∑
j∈G
uijyj | y ∈ R
G
≥0, ∑
j∈G
yj = 1, ∑
j∈G
yjpj ≤ ∑
j∈G
eijpj
}
.
Replacing pj by (p
′
j − 1)/r+ 1 for all j ∈ G, we get:
∀i ∈ A : ∑
j∈G
uijxij = max
{
∑
j∈G
uijyj | y ∈ R
G
≥0, ∑
j∈G
yj = 1, ∑
j∈G
yj
(
p′j − 1
r
+ 1
)
≤ ∑
j∈G
eij
(
p′j − 1
r
+ 1
)}
.
Simplifying the above using ∑j∈G eij = 1 and ∑j∈G yj = 1 for all i ∈ A, we get:
∀i ∈ A : ∑
j∈G
uijxij = max
{
∑
j∈G
uijyj | y ∈ R
G
≥0, ∑
j∈G
yj = 1, ∑
j∈G
yjp
′
j ≤ ∑
j∈G
eijp
′
j
}
.
The above implies that x gives each agent an optimal bundle at prices p′. This, together with the
fact that x is a fractional perfect matching, shows that (x, p′) is also an equilibrium.
Unlike HZ, which always admits an equilibrium, ADHZ has instances which do not admit an
equilibrium, as observed by Hylland and Zeckhauser [HZ79]. Below we give a counterexample
in which the demand graph is strongly connected and utilities are dichotomous.
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Proposition 17. The ADHZ market with dichotomous utilities shown in Figure 1 does not admit an
equilibrium.
s t
a
b
c
d
e
Figure 1: The demand graph of an ADHZ market with dichotomous utilities and no equilib-
rium. Each node represents an agent as well as the good possessed by this agent in her initial
endowment. An arrow from i to j represents uij = 1; the rest of the edges have utility 0.
Proof. Assume there is an equilibrium (x, p) in this market. Further, using Lemma 16, we can
assume that the minimum price of a good is zero at p. This implies that no agent will buy a zero
utility good at a positive price.
Each agent buys a total of one unit of goods and s is the only agent having positive utility for
goods a and b. Therefore, at least one of these goods is not fully sold to s and must be sold to
an agent deriving zero utility from it. Therefore this good must have zero price. Without loss of
generality, assume pa = 0. Since a has no budget and c and d are desired only by a, pc = pd = 0,
otherwise c and d cannot be sold. For the same reason, pe = 0. Now observe that both agents c
and d have a utility 1 edge to a good of price zero, namely e. Therefore, the optimal bundle of
both c and d is e. But then e would have to be matched twice which is a contradiction.
Even if ADHZ equilibria do exist, computing them is at least as hard as computing HZ equilibria.
This follows from the following reduction.
Proposition 18. Consider an HZ market with unit budgets. Define an ADHZ market by giving every
agent as endowment an equal amount of every good. Then every HZ equilibrium in which the prices sum
up to n is an ADHZ equilibrium and every ADHZ equilibrium yields an HZ equilibrium by rescaling all
prices by n/∑j∈G pj.
[VY20] gave an instance of HZ with four agents and four goods which has one equilibrium in
which all agents fully spend their budgets, and allocations and prices are irrational. Since this
example satisfies the conditions of Proposition 18, we get that the modification of the example of
[VY20], as stated in the Proposition, is an instance for ADHZ having only irrational equilibria.
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4 Existence and Properties of ǫ-Approximate ADHZ Equilibria
Since ADHZ equilibria generally do not exist we will study the following approximate equilib-
rium notion instead.
Definition 19. An ǫ-approximate ADHZ equilibrium is an HZ equilibrium (x, p) for a budget vector
b with
(1− ǫ) ∑
j∈G
pjeij ≤ bi ≤ ǫ+ ∑
j∈G
pjeij
for all i ∈ A. Moreover, we require that if two agents have the same endowment, then their
budget should also be the same.
Remark 20. The additive error term on the upper bound is necessary as otherwise the coun-
terexample from Proposition 17 still works. On the other hand, the multiplicative lower bound
is useful to get approximate individual rationality. However, one can always find approximate
equilibria in which the sum of prices is bounded by n, so this implies
∑
j∈G
pjeij − ǫ
′ ≤ bi ≤ ∑
j∈G
pjeij + ǫ
′
for ǫ′ := nǫ.
Remark 21. By using the instance in Figure 1 as a gadget, it is easy to construct very restricted
ADHZmarkets which require a constant fraction of agents to get money over their ADHZ budget
in order for an equilibrium to exist. Thus, it is not possible to simply inject some money into one
vertex of every strongly connected component in order to obtain an equilibrium.
In our notion of approximate equilibrium, we do not relax the fractional perfect matching con-
straints or the optimum bundle condition. We only allow the budgets of agents to be slightly
different from the money they would normally obtain in an ADHZ market. Hence the step of
randomly rounding the equilibrium allocation to an integral perfect matching is the same as in
the HZ scheme.
Theorem 22. Any ǫ-approximate ADHZ equilibrium is Pareto optimal, approximately individually ra-
tional, equal-type envy-free.
Proof. Pareto optimality follows just as for the non-approximate ADHZ setting from the fact that
an ǫ-approximate ADHZ equilibrium is first and foremost an HZ equilibrium.
For approximate individual rationality note that every agent gets a budget of at least 1− ǫ times
the cost of their endowment. Hence their utility can decrease by at most a factor of 1− ǫ.
Equal-type envy-freeness follows immediately from the condition that agents with the same
endowment have the same budget.
As with ADHZ equilibria, we expect that ǫ-approximate ADHZ equilibria are still approximately
incentive compatible in large markets.
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While approximate equilibrium notions are more amenable to computation, they generally do
not lend themselves well to existence proofs. However, our notion of ǫ-approximate ADHZ
equilibrium is a slight relaxation of the notion of an α-slack equilibrium introduced in [EMZ19a].
Definition 23. An α-slack ADHZ equilibrium for α ∈ [0, 1] is an HZ equilibrium (x, p) for a budget
vector b in which bi = α+ (1− α)∑j∈G pjeij for all i ∈ A.
Theorem 24 (Theorem 2 in [EMZ19a]). In any ADHZ market, α-slack equilibria always exist if α > 0.
Note that any α-slack equilibrium is automatically also an α-approximate equilibrium. Thus we
get the following.
Theorem 25. In any ADHZ market, ǫ-approximate equilibria always exist if ǫ > 0.
5 Algorithm for Dichotomous Utilities
We now turn our attention to the case of dichotomous utilities. Before we can tackle the ADHZ
setting, let us first give an algorithm that can compute HZ equilibria with non-uniform budgets.
This is an extension of the algorithm presented in [VY20]. In the following, fix some HZ market
consisting of n agents and goods with uij ∈ {0, 1} for all i ∈ A and j ∈ G. If uij = 1, we will say
that i likes j (and dislikes otherwise). We assume that every agent likes at least one good.
Remark 26. Any HZ equilibrium (x, p) for the utilities uij is also an equilibrium for u˜ij where
u˜ij =
{
ai if uij = 0,
bi if uij = 1
for all agents i, goods j, and arbitrary 0 ≤ ai < bi for every agent. This is because
∑
j∈G
u˜ijxij = ai + (bi − ai) ∑
j∈G
uijxij
since x is a fractional perfect matching. Hence utility function u˜ is an affine transformation of
utility function u; the former is called a bi-valued utility function.
Lemma 27. Let (pj)j∈G be a vector of non-negative prices. For any ρ ≥ 0, let G(ρ) be the goods which
are sold at price ρ and let A(ρ) be those agents for which the cheapest price of any liked good is ρ. Assume
that
• there is a matching in the utility 1 edges on A(0) ∪ G(0) which covers all agents in A(0) and
• if ρ > 0 is equal to the price of some good, then the flow network shown in Figure 2 has a maximum
flow of size ρ|G(ρ)|.
Then we can compute a fractional perfect matching x which makes (x, p) an HZ equilibrium in polynomial
time.
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Figure 2: Shown is the flow network which corresponds to finding an equilibrium allocation in
price class ρ. Filled circles represent agents in A(ρ) with bi < ρ, empty circles are agents in A(ρ)
with bi ≥ ρ, and diamond vertices are goods in G(ρ). The contiguous edges represent all utility
1 edges and have infinity capacity (utility 0 edges are not part of the network). Dashed edges to
empty circle vertices i have capacity bi whereas the other dashed edges have capacity ρ.
Proof. Allocate every agent in A(0) to some good in G(0) according to the matching which exists
by assumption. Let ρ > 0, be the price of some good. Then we compute the maximum flow f (ρ)
in the flow network from Figure 2 and allocate xij = f
(ρ)
i,j /ρ for all i ∈ A(ρ) and j ∈ G(ρ). Lastly,
extend x to a fractional perfect matching by matching the remaining capacity of the agents to the
remaining capacity of goods in G(0).
Clearly, no agent exceeds their budget. To see that this yields an HZ equilibrium allocation, note
that every agent only spends money on cheapest liked goods and if they do not get allocated
entirely to liked goods, then they additionally spend all of their budget. This ensures that every
agent gets an optimum bundle.
Theorem 28. For any rational budget vector b, we can compute an HZ equilibrium (x, p) in polynomial
time.
Proof. We start in the same way is the algorithm in [VY20]: by computing a minimum vertex
cover in the graph of utility 1 edges, we partition A = A1 ∪ A2 and G1 ∪ G2 such that
• every agent in A2 can be matched to a distinct liked good in G2,
• every agent in A1 only has liked goods in G1, and
• for every S ⊆ G2 we have |N−(S)| ≥ |S| where N−(S)| are the agents which have a liked
good in S.
Set pj = 0 for all j ∈ G2 and pj = mini∈A1 bi for all j ∈ G1. Now we run a DPSV-like [DPSV08]
algorithm on A1 ∪ G1 to raise prices until certain sets of goods become tight.
For each i ∈ A, let βi be its effective budget at current prices p, that is the minimum of its actual
budget bi and the price of its cheapest liked good. The algorithm will now raise all prices p at
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the same rate until there is a set S ⊆ G1 which goes tight in the sense that
∑
i∈Γ(S)
βi = ∑
j∈S
pj
where Γ is the collection of agents which have a cheapest liked good in S. At this point, we freeze
the prices of the goods in S. If all prices have been frozen we are done. Otherwise, we continue
raising all unfrozen prices of goods in G1.
It is easy to see that if the prices keep rising, eventually each agents’ effective budget will be their
real budget and so a set must become tight at some point. We will not go into detail here but it
is possible to find the next set which will go tight in polynomial time similar as in DPSV. Finally,
since we never unfreeze prices, there will be at most n iterations of the algorithm and hence it
runs in polynomial time overall.
We observe that as in the proof of the DPSV algorithm, for any S ⊆ G1, we have that ∑i∈Γ(S) βi ≥
∑j∈A pj and ∑i∈A1 βi = ∑j∈G1 pj. It is then easy to show that this implies that for any price ρ
above 0, the corresponding flow network from Figure 2 supports a flow of value ρ|G(ρ)| by the
max-flow min-cut theorem. Thus we can apply Lemma 27 to get an equilibrium allocation.
Lemma 29. Let b and b′ be two budget vectors with 0 ≤ b ≤ b′. Assume we are given an HZ equilibrium
(x, p) for the budgets b. Then we can compute in polynomial time a new HZ equilibrium (x′, p′) with
p ≤ p′ for the budgets b′.
Proof. We will simply run the same algorithm as in the proof of Theorem 28, except that this time
we start with the prices p. More precisely, we increase the lowest non-zero price until a set goes
tight or it becomes equal to the next higher price, then repeat this process until we once again get
∑i∈Γ(S) βi ≥ ∑j∈A pj and ∑i∈Γ(G1) βi = ∑j∈G1 pj where G1 is now defined as the set of goods with
positive prices in (x, p). As in the proof of Theorem 28, this will freeze all prices in polynomial
time at which point we can use a max-flow min-cut argument to construct the new equilibrium
allocation x′ in polynomial time.
Let us now return to the approximate ADHZ setting. Instead of budgets, fix now some fractional
perfect matching of endowments (eij)i∈A,j∈G.
Theorem 30. An ǫ-approximate ADHZ equilibrium for rational ǫ ∈ (0, 1), can be computed in time
polynomial in 1ǫ and n, i.e. by a fully polynomial time approximation scheme.
Proof. We will iteratively apply Lemma 29. Start by setting b
(1)
i :=
ǫ
2 for all i ∈ A and computing
an HZ equilibrium (x(1), p(1)) according to Theorem 28. Beginning with k := 1, we run the
following algorithm.
1. Let b
(k+1)
i :=
ǫ
2 + (1−
ǫ
2)∑j∈G p
(k)
j eij for all i ∈ A.
2. Compute a new HZ equilibrium (x(k+1), p(k+1)) for budgets b(k+1) according to Lemma 29
using the old equilibrium (x(k), p(k)) as the starting point. Note that since p(k) ≥ p(k−1) we
always have b(k+1) ≥ b(k) and so this is well-defined.
3. Set k := k+ 1 and go back to step 1.
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Note that
∑
i∈A
b
(k+1)
i =
ǫ
2
n+
(
1−
ǫ
2
)
∑
j∈G
p
(k)
j
≤
ǫ
2
n+
(
1−
ǫ
2
)
∑
i∈A
b
(k)
i
and thus
∑
j∈G
p
(k)
j ≤ ∑
i∈A
b
(k)
i ≤ n
as otherwise we would get ∑i∈A b
(k+1)
i < ∑i∈A b
(k)
i .
Let K be the first iteration such that p(K) ≤ 1−ǫ/21−ǫ p
(K−1). Note that
K ≤ n log 1−ǫ/2
1−ǫ
(n
ǫ
)
= O
(n
ǫ
log
(n
ǫ
))
since all non-zero prices are initialized to at least ǫ but are bounded by n. Then (x(K), p(K)) is an
ǫ-approximate ADHZ equilibrium with budget vector b(K) because for all i ∈ A we have
b
(K)
i =
ǫ
2
+
(
1−
ǫ
2
)
∑
j∈G
p
(K−1)
j eij
∈
[
(1− ǫ) ∑
j∈G
p
(K)
j eij, ǫ+ ∑
j∈G
p
(K)
j eij
]
.
Lastly, we note that since the number of iterations is bounded by O( nǫ log(
n
ǫ )) and each iteration
runs in polynomial time, the total runtime is polynomial in 1ǫ and n as claimed.
6 An RCP for the HZ Scheme under Dichotomous Utilities
We will assume without loss of generality that each agent i ∈ A likes some good j ∈ G, i.e.
uij = 1. We will show that program (CP) given below is the required RCP. Observe that it is
an extension of the Eisenberg-Gale convex program [EG59] via the second constraint, i.e. the
amount of goods allocated to each agent is at most 1.
max ∑i∈A log∑j∈G uijxij
subject to ∀j ∈ G : ∑i∈A xij ≤ 1
∀i ∈ A : ∑j∈G xij ≤ 1
∀i ∈ A, j ∈ G : xij ≥ 0
. (CP)
Let pj’s and αi’s denote the non-negative dual variables for the first and second constraints,
respectively.
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Theorem 31. Any HZ equilibrium is an optimal solution to (CP), and every optimal solution of (CP) can
be trivially extended to an HZ equilibrium. Furthermore, the latter can be expressed via rational numbers
whose denominators have polynomial, in n, number of bits, thereby showing that (CP) is a rational convex
program.
Proof. Let ui := ∑j∈G uijxij. Clearly, in any HZ equilibrium, since each agent i is allocated an
optimal bundle of goods, she will be allocated a non-zero amount of a unit-utility good and hence
will satisfy ui > 0. Furthermore, in an optimal solution x of (CP), every agent must have positive
utility, because otherwise the objective function value will be −∞. Therefore, ∀i ∈ A : ui > 0.
The KKT conditions of this program are:
1. ∀i ∈ A : αi ≥ 0.
2. ∀j ∈ G : pj ≥ 0.
3. ∀i ∈ A : If αi > 0 then ∑j xij = 1.
4. ∀j ∈ G : If pj > 0 then ∑i xij = 1.
5. ∀i ∈ A, j ∈ G : uij ≤ ui(pj + αi).
6. ∀i ∈ A, j ∈ G : xij > 0 ⇒ uij = ui(pj + αi).
To prove the forward direction of the first statement, let (x, p) be an HZ equilibrium. Since x is a
fractional perfect matching on agents and goods, it satisfies the constraints of (CP) and is hence
a feasible solution for it. We are left with proving optimality.
The KKT conditions 2, 3 and 4 are clearly satisfied by (x, p). Next, consider agent i. If there is a
good j such that pj ≤ 1 and uij = 1, then i will be allocated one unit of the cheapest such goods.
Assume the price of the latter is p. Define αi = 1− p. Clearly ui = 1. Now, it is easy to check
that Conditions 1, 5 and 6 are also holding.
Next assume that every good j such that uij = 1 has pj > 1 and let p be the cheapest such price.
Clearly, i’s optimal bundle will contain 1/p amount of these goods, giving her total utility 1/p.
Since the equilibrium always has a zero-priced good, that good, say j, must have uij = 0. Now,
i must be buying such zero-utility zero-priced goods to get to one unit of goods. We will define
αi = 0. Again, it is easy to check that Conditions 1, 5 and 6 are holding. Hence we get that (x, p)
is an optimal solution to (CP).
Next, we prove the reverse direction of the first statement. Let (x, p) be an optimal solution to
(CP). Assume that agent i is allocated good j, i.e. xij > 0. We consider the following two cases:
(a) uij = 0. Using Condition 6 and ui > 0, we get that pj = αi = 0.
(b) uij = 1. Using Conditions 5 and 6 and ui > 0, we get that the price of good j is the cheapest
among all goods for which i’s utility is 1.
For each agent i, multiply the equality in Condition 6 by xij and sum over all j to get:
∑
j
xijuij = ui ∑
j
xij(pj + αi)
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After canceling ui from both sides we obtain
∑
j
xij(pj + αi) = 1 = ∑
j
xijpj + αi ∑
j
xij.
Now, if αi > 0, then ∑j xij = 1 and if αi = 0, then αi ∑j xij = 0 = αi. Therefore, in both cases
αi ∑j xij = αi. Hence,
∑
j
xijpj = 1− αi.
We will view the dual variables p of the optimal solution (x, p) as prices of goods. The above
statement then implies that agent i’s bundle costs 1− αi.
Let S denote the set of agents who get less than one unit of goods, i.e. S := {i ∈ A | ∑j xij < 1},
and let T denote the set of partially allocated goods, i.e. T := {j ∈ G | ∑i xij < 1}. By Condition
4, pj = 0 for each j ∈ T. Observe that if for i ∈ S and j ∈ T, uij = 1, then by allocating a positive
amount of good j to i, the objective function value of program (CP) strictly increases, giving a
contradiction. Therefore, uij = 0.
Since the number of agents equals the number of goods, the total deficiency of agents in solution
x equals the total amount of unallocated goods. Therefore, we can arbitrarily allocate unallocated
goods in T to deficient agents in S so as to obtain a fractional perfect matching, say x′. Clearly,
(x′, p) is still an optimal solution to (CP) and is also an HZ equilibrium.
For the second statement, we will start with this solution (x′, p). Let G′ ⊆ G denote the set
of goods with prices bigger than 1, i.e. G′ = {j ∈ G | pj > 1} and let A
′ ⊆ A be the set of
agents who have allocations from G′. Each of these agents satisfies αi = 0 and spends exactly 1
dollar on goods in G′. Consider the connected components of bipartite graph (A′,G′, E), where
E = {(i, j) ∈ (A′,G′) | xij > 0}. Cases (a) and (b) imply that all goods in a connected component
C must have the same price, say pC. Clearly, the sum of prices of all goods in C equals the total
number of agents in C, and hence their total money. This implies that pC is rational. Clearly,
there is a rational allocation of 1/pC amount of goods to every agent in C.
Next, let G′′ ⊆ G denote the set of goods with prices in the interval (0, 1], i.e. G′′ = {j ∈ G | 0 <
pj ≤ 1} and let A
′′ ⊆ A be the set of agents who have allocations from G′′. Clearly, |G′′| = |A′′|.
Observe that if prices of all goods in G′′ are set to 1, we still get an equilibrium. For each agent
in A′′, allocate one unit of a distinct good from G′′.
This is the desired rational optimal solution to (CP), completing the proof.
Remark 32. The proof of Theorem 31 shows that for the dichotomous case, the dual of (CP) yields
equilibrium prices. In contrast, for arbitrary utilities, there is no known mathematical construct,
no matter how inefficient its computation, that yields equilibrium prices. In a sense, this should
not be surprising, since there is a polynomial time algorithm for computing an equilibrium for
the dichotomous case [VY20].
Since the objective function in (CP) is strictly concave, the utility derived by each agent i must be
the same in all solutions of (CP). Hence, we get the following corollary which can be seen as a
variant of the well-known Rural Hospital Theorem; see [GI89] for the latter.
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Corollary 33. Each agent gets the same utility under all HZ equilibria with dichotomous utilities.
7 Rationality of α-Slack Equilibria under Dichotomous Utilities
If one wishes to compute exact equilibria (if they exist) instead of approximate ones, clearly a
necessary condition is that equilibria are always rational. As noted in Section 4, with general
utilities both HZ and ADHZ may have only irrational equilibria. On the other hand, with {0, 1}-
utilities, there are always rational HZ equilibria. In this section we extend this result to α-slack
equilibria in the ADHZ setting.
Fix some ADHZ market with {0, 1}-utilities, rational endowment vectors e, and some rational
α > 0. Our rationality proof will work in two steps: First we show that as a consequence of
Theorem 28, there always exists a special α-slack equilibrium in which prices are minimal in some
sense. Then we will show that the price vector of such a special equilibrium is the unique solution
to a system of linear equations with rational coefficients, proving rationality of the prices (and
hence there also exists a rational allocation).
Definition 34. An HZ equilibrium (x, p) is called special if
1. there is a good j ∈ G with pj = 0, and
2. for every price ρ > 0 in p, there is an agent i whose cheapest liked goods have price ρ and
whose budget is at most ρ, i.e., ρ = min{pj | uij = 1, j ∈ G} and bi ≤ ρ.
Lemma 35. The algorithm described in Theorem 28 always computes a special equilibrium.
Proof. We will show that at any point in the algorithm, that if there is some good of price ρ > 0,
then there is some i ∈ A1 such that i’s cheapest desirable goods have price ρ and βi = bi. Note
that this property holds at the beginning of the algorithm since the prices are set to the minimum
budget of an agent in A1. Furthermore, as prices increase, the number of agents i ∈ A1 with
βi = bi can only increase.
So the only way in which this property could be lost is at the points where prices are frozen
and the remaining prices are increased, thus decreasing the number of cheapest desirable goods
for some agents. Let S ⊆ G1 be the set of goods which have been frozen at some point in the
algorithm and assume that we have raised prices so that the price ρ of items in G1 \ S is strictly
larger than the prices in S. Furthermore, assume for the sake of a contradiction that for all
i ∈ Γ(G1 \ S), we have that βi = ρ < bi. But then
∑
i∈Γ(G1\S)
βi = ρ · |Γ(G1 \ S)| ≥ ρ · |G1 \ S| = ∑
j∈G1\S
pj.
This means that G1 \ S would have already been frozen in the algorithm contradicting the fact
that ρ is strictly greater than the prices in S.
Lemma 36. The prices of the HZ equilibrium as computed in Theorem 28 depend continuously on the
budgets assuming the initial vertex cover is chosen consistently.
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Proof. Let b and b′ be two distinct positive budget vectors with ‖b − b′‖∞ ≤ ǫ for some ǫ > 0.
Consider running the algorithm on b and b′ at the same time, note that initially prices differ by
at most ǫ everywhere. Whenever a set S is frozen for the budgets b, all prices in that set must
also be frozen for b′ soon afterwards since there is at most nǫ more budget available (otherwise
S would go overtight).
Let p and p′ be the prices computed for budgets b and b′ respectively. Then we have just observed
that p′ ≤ p+ nǫ and symmetrically p ≤ p′ + nǫ. Thus p depends continuously on b.
Theorem 37. There exists a special α-slack equilibrium.
Proof. Let P := {p ∈ RG≥0 | ∑j∈G pj ≤ n} be the set of feasible price vectors. Given some p ∈ P,
define f (p) to be the prices output by the algorithm from Theorem 28 when applied to the
budgets
bi := α+ (1− α) ∑
j∈G
pjeij
for all i ∈ A.
Clearly, f maps P into P and by Lemma 36, f is continuous. So by Brouwer’s fixed point theorem,
it has a fixed point p∗ ∈ P. But by definition of f , this fixed point yields an α-slack equilibrium
and by Lemma 35, this equilibrium is special.
Lemma 38. Special α-slack equilibria have rational prices.
Proof. Let (x, p) be a special α-slack equilibrium. Let 0 = ρ1 ≤ · · · ≤ ρk be the distinct prices in
p. For each ρl > 0, we let Am(ρl) ⊆ A(ρl) be those agents whose budget is at most ρl and we let
As(ρl) ⊆ A(ρl) be the remaining agents whose budget is more than ρl .
Since (x, p) is an α-slack equilibrium, we then have that
∑
i∈Am(ρl)

α+ (1− α) k∑
l′=2
ρl′ ∑
j∈G(ρl′)
eij

+ ρl |As(ρl)| = ρl |G(ρl)|. (1)
where Am(ρl) 6= ∅ since (x, p) is a special equilibrium. Together with ρ1 = 0, this gives us a
system of linear equations with rational coefficients that (ρ1, . . . , ρk) is a solution to.
Finally, let us show that this system has unique solutions. To see this let there be some other
solution vector (ρ′1, . . . , ρ
′
k). Assume without loss of generality that there is some l with ρl > ρ
′
l as
otherwise we can swap ρ and ρ′. Let l∗ be the index maximizing
ρl
ρ′l
and consider constraint (1) for
this l∗. But now assuming that ρ′ satisfies this constraint, ρl cannot satisfy it since, compared to
ρ′, the right-hand side increases by a factor of
ρl
ρ′l
whereas the left-hand side increases by strictly
less due to the presence of ∑i∈Am(ρl∗) α > 0.
Theorem 39. There exists a rational α-slack equilibrium.
Proof. By Theorem 37, there always exists a special α-slack equilibrium and by Lemma 38, this
equilibrium must have rational prices. To get a rational allocation, one can obtain an allocation
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via a flow network in each price class as shown in Lemma 27. Since max-flows in networks with
rational weights can always be chosen to be rational, the theorem follows.
8 Discussion
Regarding α-slack equilibria, we leave the open questions of giving an RCP and obtaining a
combinatorial polynomial time algorithm for the case of dichotomous utilities and rational α.
Also, we ask if ǫ-approximate ADHZ is in PPAD and if it is PPAD-hard.
Finally, in Section 1.2 we stated a number of results that build on the HZ scheme and others that
are generalizations of the HZ scheme. It will be interesting to explore similar extensions of the
ǫ-approximate ADHZ model as well.
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